Argentina: A template for US foreign policy in the Americas

In reality, the alignment between the US and Argentina predated Trump’s second term; the two nations signed an MoU in August 2024, during the Biden administration, giving Argentina access to the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a US-led group of 14 nations and the EU, and the ability to integrate into US strategic supply chains. However, since then, Team Trump has doubled down on this strategy, using three major trade and policy levers:

1. The interoperability model

In November 2025, Argentina became the first country to agree to “regulatory interoperability” with the United States, effectively trading its regulatory autonomy for preferential market access. By way of example, under this deal, Argentina is committed to accepting US FDA certificates for medical devices and US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) for automobiles without additional testing. The speed at which President Milei agreed allowed the US to use the Argentina deal as a “copy and paste” template for Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala later that same day. 

These agreements have inevitably squeezed out China, historically one of Argentina’s most significant trading partners. Nowhere was this more evident than in the extraordinary currency swap deal announced by the US Treasury in October 2025, providing support to the peso and effectively replacing Chinese swap lines. Almost symbolically, the following month, Milei announced that the Chinese-Argentine radiotelescope project in San Juan would be discontinued. 

2. Access to resources 

Argentina’s mineral and energy assets have become a central focus for US critical resource security. For a country that holds more than 20% of the world’s lithium resources, Western investors are stepping up their participation, reassured by Milei’s generous package of investment incentives and guarantees known as RIGI. Examples include the Rincón lithium project, where Rio Tinto is targeting 50,000 tonnes per year by 2028, and the BHP-Lundin joint venture in the Vicuña district, which is targeting 180,000 tonnes of copper production annually.

While lithium often dominates the headlines, the energy sector is where US investors are growing their presence, not least in Argentina’s massive and world-class unconventional oil & gas asset Vaca Muerta. Examples include:

• Chevron’s expanded commitment to the Loma Campana and Narambuena blocks
• Shell’s operation of four majority-owned license blocks, despite recent portfolio streamlining
• The deployment of advanced rig technology from American oilfield services companies such as Patterson-UTI and Baker Hughes.

China is not out of the picture - Argentina’s largest private energy company, Pan American Energy (PAE), is still 50% owned by China’s CNOOC - but Vaca Muerta has become a vital strategic hedge for the US against global instability. Argentina is poised to surpass Venezuela as the third-largest producer in South America by the end of 2026. While the capture of Maduro has reopened the door to Venezuelan crude, experts note that rebuilding Venezuela’s infrastructure will take nearly a decade and cost up to USD 100 billion. In contrast, Vaca Muerta is already producing 600,000 barrels per day and offers “short-cycle” flexibility — allowing the US and its allies to adjust investment and production far more rapidly than conventional fields.

3. Friendshoring 

Shifting away from the nearshoring focus on Mexico during the Biden administration, Argentina is poised to become an important territory for friendshoring under the new trade investment partnership. Due to its established industrial capacity in pharmaceuticals and automotive manufacturing, there are now opportunities for sectors that have historically been closed to US competition by high tariffs and protectionist local standards. 

This industrial base is now being reconfigured into a US-aligned supply chain. In January, Argentina’s premier construction engineering company IMPSA was sold to US-based ARC Energy, marking the first state-owned company privatized under the Milei administration. Planning to use IMPSA’s manufacturing capacity to produce port cranes for the US market. This replaces Chinese-made cranes flagged as cybersecurity risks, transforming a former state-dependent company into a critical node in the US secure supply chain. This was further bolstered on January 17, 2026, when the EU and Mercosur signed a trade deal in Asunción, Paraguay, creating a massive Western-aligned trade zone that effectively squeezes out Chinese influence in the Southern Cone.

What next?

Over the last 18 months, Argentina has been transformed geopolitically into a state that is now aligned and integrated with the US to an unprecedented degree. This has been achieved with the support of the president, Javier Milei, who is in lockstep with the Trump administration. The question is now whether the US can roll out this template in other Western Hemisphere countries, with or without the same kind of local political support.